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A key element of the prosperity agenda of the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
of North America is a commitment of the NAFTA partners to liberalize NAFTA 
rules of origin and to enact minor modifications to third-country tariffs in cases where 
such changes will increase competitiveness. A recent study for the province of Alberta 
suggested several criteria for enacting tariff “streamlining” and calculated annual benefit 
of CAN$ 80 million for exporters located in Alberta. This study applies the Alberta 
methodology to examine the results of implementing similar modifications to NAFTA 
tariffs for exports from Washington and California to Canada. We also identify the 
impediments to tariff streamlining such as inconsistent tariff line classifications at the 
8 and 10-digit level. These inconsistencies point to benefits from adopting comparable 
intra-NAFTA tariff codes down to the 10-digit level. 
differences in external tariffs, 
consistent with multilateral 
negotiation strategies. 
(Source: http://www.spp.gov/prosperity_
working/index.asp?dName=prosperity_
working)
This goal involves both the 
liberalization of NAFTA rules of origin 
and relatively minor “rationalization” 
of NAFTA third-country tariffs in cases 
where the differences between the 
NAFTA partners’ third-country tariff 
rates are small.
Rules of origin are a feature of free 
trade areas such as NAFTA but are not 
needed within a customs union such 
as exists within the European Union. 
Members of a customs union impose 
a common external tariff on non-
members of the customs union, but 
members of a free trade area are free to 
set their own tariffs on imports from 
countries outside of the free trade area. 
If differences in tariffs are large enough, 
1. INTRODUCTION
The Security and Prosperity Partnership 
of North America (SPP) is an initiative 
launched in 2005 by the leaders of 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
to promote security and prosperity 
through cooperation and sharing of 
information. One component of the 
prosperity agenda is a Working Group 
on the movement of goods which 
was created to pursue the following 
objectives:
… lower the transaction costs 
of trade in goods by liberalizing 
the requirements for obtaining 
duty-free treatment under 
NAFTA, including through the 
reduction of “rules of origin” 
costs on goods traded between our 
countries. Each country should 
have in place procedures to allow 
speedy implementation of rules 
of origin modifications. Increase 
competitiveness by exploring 
additional supply chain options, 
such as by rationalizing minor 
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non-members of a free trade area might 
have an incentive to channel exports 
to all members of the free trade area 
through the lowest-tariff country. To 
eliminate this incentive, free trade areas 
establish procedures to prevent the 
routing of non-member exports through 
a “back door” route via the lowest-
tariff partner. In the case of NAFTA, 
rules of origin are used to establish 
whether a good originates within North 
America and is thus able to benefit from 
preferential NAFTA tariff rates at the 
borders between the NAFTA partners. 
Complying with rules of origin is costly 
for exporters, however, and under the 
SPP, NAFTA countries are seeking to 
reduce the burden of rules of origin in 
order to enhance the competitiveness 
of North American producers.
Given that the NAFTA countries are 
pursuing the objective of liberalizing 
or eliminating rules of origin, policy 
makers on both sides of the border 
need to measure the potential impact 
of liberalizing rules of origin and 
rationalizing NAFTA tariffs. Such an 
analysis of tariff rationalization was 
recently conducted for the province of 
Alberta by Ballantyne, Hoffman, and 
Mirus (2004), who proposed an agenda 
for tariff rationalization which they 
refer to as a “streamlining” of NAFTA 
tariffs.  The Ballantyne et al study 
found that a conservative estimate of 
the savings for Alberta was CAN$ 80 
million per year based on trade patterns 
from 2002. They argued that a similar 
benefit would accrue to U.S. partners so 
that the tariff modifications enhance 
the competitiveness of firms on both 
sides of the Canada-U.S. border. The 
authors also noted that these benefits 
can be attained through administrative 
agreements and therefore would not 
require high-level trade negotiations 
that could have the potential to become 
highly-politicized.
The primary goal of this paper is to 
apply the Ballantyne et al analysis to the 
case of Washington State. An additional 
motivation for the analysis conducted 
in this study is the focus on a perimeter 
approach to border policy found in 
the policy documents of both the SPP 
and the Perimeter Clearance Coalition. 
For goods, the core idea of the 2002 
version of the Perimeter Clearance 
Strategy is to “[deal] with goods at 
point of first arrival” in North America. 
The customs authority of the receiving 
country would then share information 
with a partner country if the good is in 
transit. This coordination and sharing 
of information provides an additional 
opportunity to streamline NAFTA 
tariffs whenever North American origin 
can be conferred at the first point of 
entry to the continent.  This study will 
discuss the complementarities between 
the goals of tariff streamlining and a 
perimeter clearance strategy. 
2. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
NAFTA-related initiatives to liberalize 
rules of origin have been implemented 
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in four batches: on January 1 of 2003 
and 2005 and on July 1 of 2005 and 
2006. These changes to rules of origin 
have typically involved removing 
regional value content restrictions 
or reducing the degree of tariff 
classification transformation needed to 
qualify as originating in North America. 
For example, among the liberalizations 
implemented on July 1, 2006, was the 
removal of restrictions on the use of 
non-originating printed circuit boards 
in televisions and monitors. These 
liberalizations have typically been 
initiated based on suggestions solicited 
from industry.  
To date, there has been almost no 
ex post analysis of the qualitative and 
quantitative impacts of liberalizing 
rules of origin. Nevertheless, the agenda 
continues to move forward. For example, 
an August 2007 Globe and Mail article 
quoted Canadian International Trade 
Minister David Emerson who indicated 
that “a key topic” of the August 2007 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission would 
be “more talk on changing rules of 
origin.” Minister Emerson said that 
these changes would “cover billions of 
dollars in trade, so it’s actually a very 
material initiative that most people 
never think of but it’s of fundamental 
importance and will greatly enhance 
the scope of NAFTA.” The fact that there 
is political will to continue the process 
of liberalizing rules of origin reveals the 
benefits that the NAFTA governments 
expect to derive from the process. 
While the SPP raises the possibility of 
harmonization of third-country tariffs 
in cases where existing differences are 
minor, this avenue has not been pursued 
as aggressively as the liberalization of 
rules of origin. This paper provides some 
information regarding the potential to 
harmonize certain third country tariffs 
in cases where the United States already 
charges low or zero tariffs in the general 
system of preferences. In addition, this 
study takes the first component of a 
methodology proposed by Ballantyne 
et al and applies this component to the 
case of trade between Washington State 
and Canada. Ballantyne et al suggested 
that there are three cases in which 
Canadian and U.S. third-country tariffs 
could be streamlined for a particular 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code:
(i) Canada and the United States 
already apply 0 percent tariffs for 
non-NAFTA countries,
(ii) Either Canada and/or the United 
States applies a tariff of no more 
than 5 percent for non-NAFTA 
countries,
(iii) Situation (ii) does not apply but 
the Canadian and U.S. non-
NAFTA tariff rates are within 2 
percentage points of each other. 
The conditions outlined in these three 
cases are motivated by the ostensible 
goal of rules of origin: to prevent 
goods from non-NAFTA countries 
from entering one NAFTA country via 
a NAFTA partner in order to benefit 
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from lower third-country tariff rates in 
the partner country. In case (i) there is 
no incentive whatsoever to circumvent 
third-country tariffs by entering the 
United States via a NAFTA partner. 
In cases (ii) and (iii) there is a small 
incentive to use the “back door” entry 
approach, but the benefit is sufficiently 
small that it is unlikely to motivate a 
trade routing decision.
Following Ballantyne et al, we examine 
the estimated benefits of their first case 
of proposed tariff streamlining. To 
accomplish this, we begin by obtaining 
data on exports from Washington to 
Canada at the 6-digit HS level. We use 
the 6-digit level of detail rather than the 
more precise 8 or 10-digit level because 
HS codes are only harmonized between 
Canada and the United States at the 
Chapter
Rank
HS 
Code
Calculated 
Duties
Chapter
Share
Cumulative 
Share
1 62 $4,389,441,874 17.4% 17.4%
2 61 $4,285,014,712 17.0% 34.5%
3 87 $2,883,414,732 11.5% 45.9%
4 64 $1,873,663,256 7.4% 53.4%
5 85 $1,681,935,892 6.7% 60.1%
6 84 $1,161,471,270 4.6% 64.7%
7 42 $997,761,085 4.0% 68.7%
8 39 $769,535,433 3.1% 71.7%
9 63 $678,851,851 2.7% 74.4%
10 94 $407,576,790 1.6% 76.0%
11 22 $319,121,030 1.3% 77.3%
12 29 $314,423,520 1.2% 78.5%
13 71 $290,379,112 1.2% 79.7%
14 69 $286,150,147 1.1% 80.8%
15 90 $284,384,139 1.1% 82.0%
16 40 $273,377,671 1.1% 83.1%
17 27 $258,338,450 1.0% 84.1%
18 73 $247,323,006 1.0% 85.1%
19 82 $241,847,428 1.0% 86.0%
20 70 $201,099,847 0.8% 86.8%
21-30 - $1,461,676,302 5.8% 92.6%
31-40 - $894,424,188 3.6% 96.2%
41-50 - $535,194,982 2.1% 98.3%
1-99 - $25,159,011,720 100% 100%
Table 1: Sources of U.S. Tariff Revenues of HS Chapter
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6-digit level. We first use third-country 
tariff data from the World Trade 
Organization to identify cases where 
rules of origin could be eliminated 
because both Canada and the United 
States already allow the HS6 category 
to enter duty free1. Existing estimates 
of the resource costs of rules of origin 
compliance2 are then used to determine 
the competitiveness-enhancing benefits 
of the tariff streamlining.  
3. THE STRUCTURE OF TARIFFS 
IN U.S. TRADE
The benefits of liberalizing rules of 
origin and streamlining tariffs need 
to be compared to the costs of these 
measures. One such cost is the tariff 
revenue already forgone in cases where 
both countries have most favored 
nation tariffs that are set to zero.  A 
rough measure of the revenue yielded 
by the current U.S. tariff system is 
provided by Table 1. This table is based 
on total value of duties for 2006 as 
calculated by the on-line Dataweb 
trade statistics from the web site of the 
U.S. International Trade Commission3. 
The calculated duties were obtained 
and sorted for the 99 HS chapters. 
Table 1 shows that just four chapters 
accounted for over half of calculated 
U.S. customs duties, while the top 30 
chapters yielded over 90 percent of tariff 
revenue. Figure 1 plots the cumulative 
share of tariffs yielded by successive 
sorted HS chapters. The results in this 
figure suggest that most tariffs are low 
and, as a result, the opportunity cost of 
zero tariffs is not high.
1 We will use the com-
mon term “most favored 
nation tariffs” to refer to 
the normal tariffs paid 
by countries that do not 
benefit from the NAFTA 
tariff preference. In the 
United States, the term 
“most favored nation 
tariff” was recently 
replaced by the term 
“general tariff” that ap-
plies to countries having 
“normal trade relations” 
with the United States 
but not benefiting from 
a bilateral trade agree-
ment. As of November 
2007, the only countries 
that do not benefit from 
either normal trade 
relations or a bilateral 
trade agreement with the 
United States are Cuba 
and North Korea. 
2 Compliance cost figures 
are cited by Ballantyne 
et al and also available 
from Kunimoto and 
Sawchuk (2005).
3 These data can be ac-
cessed at http://dataweb.
usitc.gov/.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Share of U.S. Tariff Revenues
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The results presented in Table 1 and 
Figure 1 suggest that many HS chapters 
provide very little tariff revenue. Indeed, 
in 2006 four HS chapters generated no 
tariff revenue at all while calculated 
tariffs were under one million dollars 
for an additional 11 HS chapters. These 
chapters, and perhaps others generating 
minimal tariff revenue, are certainly 
candidates for elimination of rules of 
origin because tariff revenues and most 
favored nation tariff rates are so low 
that there is little or no concern about 
entry of U.S. imports through Canada. 
The next section of this paper examines 
the nature of Washington State exports 
to Canada in order to determine how 
much trade is a candidate for tariff 
streamlining through elimination of 
rules of origin. 
4. A DESCRIPTION OF TRADE 
BETWEEN WASHINGTON STATE 
AND CANADA
 According to origin of movement 
state export date from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, the total value of exports from 
the state of Washington to Canada 
was $6.2 billion in 20064. The simplest 
strategy for tariff streamlining would 
involve the removal of rules of origin for 
any 6-digit HS code where both Canada 
and the United States charge most 
favored nation tariffs of zero. Rules of 
origin are non-binding constraints for 
Canada-U.S. trade in this case because 
there is no incentive for third-country 
imports to circumvent higher tariffs 
in either Canada or the United States 
simply by entering through the country 
with the lower third-country tariffs. We 
used 2006 tariff schedules for Canada 
and the United States and identified 
1,464 6-digit HS codes with tariffs of 
zero for all lines within these codes5. 
Mexico is not included in the analysis 
of this paper because the number of HS6 
codes where all three NAFTA partners 
have a zero external tariff is very small. 
The properties of the 1,464 6-digit HS 
codes with zero tariffs in both countries 
are examined in Table 2.  These “0/0” 
HS codes are grouped into six broad 
categories based on the industrial 
sector. For example, we found that 
electrical equipment accounts for just 
5 percent of the 0/0 HS6 codes, while 
4 The origin of movement 
data released by the 
U.S. Census Bureau are 
intended to capture the 
state where the shipment 
of goods originated rather 
than the state where the 
goods left the United 
States.
5 Canada and the United 
States frequently use 
8-digit and 10-digit cat-
egories within a 6-digit 
category. As a result, 
third-country tariffs 
might be zero for just a 
portion of a 6-digit HS 
code.
Category Chapters % of all lines % Free
Agriculture 1-24 13% 26%
Energy Products 25-39 20% 27%
Other Commodities 40-83 38% 27%
Machinery & Equipment 84 15% 42%
Electrical Equipment 85 5% 27%
Other Manufactured Products 86-97 9% 24%
Table 2: Sectoral Description of Free 6-digit HS Categories
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commodities other than agricultural 
and energy commodities were 38 
percent of the 1,464 HS codes identified 
as candidates for streamlining. The 
fraction of the total HS codes that are 
free for Canada and the United States 
is constant for most of these industrial 
sectors with the exception of Chapter 
84, where the percentage of free HS6 
codes is much higher because of the 
sectoral customs union in computers 
and computer parts built into the 
original NAFTA agreement. 
To measure the potential benefits of 
streamlining rules of origin for trade 
between Washington and Canada we 
first find the total amount of exports 
from Washington to Canada in the 
1,464 free/free HS6 codes.  These HS 
codes themselves account for almost 
40 percent of the total amount of 
exports from Washington to Canada 
and have a dollar value of $2.45 billion. 
This amount suggests that significant 
benefits could be obtained for trade 
between Washington state and Canada 
even if the scope of tariff streamlining 
is relatively unambitious and limited in 
scope to just a small set of high-value 
export categories. 
While it is impractical to describe 
all of the 1,464 tariffs that are zero for 
Canada and the United States, Table 
3 describes the largest 25 HS6 codes 
for Washington-Canada trade and 
identifies the 16 of these 25 HS6 codes 
where both Canada and the United 
States apply third-country tariffs equal 
to zero. In contrast, Table 4 illustrates 
the codes out of the top 25 where at least 
Rank HS Code  Dollar Amount   Rank HS Code  Dollar Amount
1 880240 $682,477,746 14 * 160411 $55,871,874
2 * 271019 $679,493,038 15 * 080920 $54,715,318
3 * 870120 $218,243,200 16 * 392330 $50,502,144
4 * 870423 $212,536,760 17 * 760612 $50,178,966
5 721420 $114,899,438 18 851750 $44,828,959
6 880330 $109,353,434 19 950410 $44,509,829
7 950490 101,444,160 20 * 842720 $43,134,024
8 * 080810 $98,586,732 21 * 761290 $42,956,680
9 852812 $84,503,341 22 * 852990 $42,801,482
10 * 760120 $73,408,501 23 * 200410 $39,518,023
11 260800 $67,282,831 24 843149 $39,504,952
12 * 890392 $64,286,104 25 * 190410 $35,449,023
13 * 870324 $62,817,772
Table 3: Washington State Exports to Canada - Top 25 6-digit HS Products
*Indicates code for which both countries apply third-country tariff of 0.
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one of the two countries applies a non-
zero third-country MFN tariff or where 
there are multiple and inconsistent 
6-digit tariff “lines” within the 6-digit 
HS codes. In some cases Canada and the 
United States have the same number 
of tariff lines but different MFN tariff 
rates. An example is 870423 (diesel 
trucks weighing more than 20 metric 
tons) where the Canadian tariff is 6.1 
percent and the U.S. tariff is 25 percent. 
An example of inconsistent tariff lines 
within a 6-digit category is the HS6 code 
271019 (an “other” category within 
the broader subheading of petroleum 
oils) which has 5 separate tariff lines in 
Canada and 11 lines in the United States. 
These inconsistencies are due to the fact 
that the two countries use inconsistent 
product definitions and tariff codes at 
the 8-digit level and this inconsistency 
precludes tariff streamlining in HS6 
codes such as 271019.  
5. BENEFITS OF TARIFF 
STREAMLINING FOR 
WASHINGTON STATE EXPORTS 
TO CANADA 
To estimate the benefits of tariff 
streamlining for Alberta, Ballantyne et al 
applied a range of possible transaction-
cost values (expressed as percentages of 
Canada United States
HS Code  Tariff Lines Min/Max Tariff (%) Tariff Lines Min/Max Tariff (%)
271019 5 0 / 8 11 5.8 / 7
870120 1 6 1 4
870423 1 6.1 1 25
080810 2 0 / 8.5 1 0
760120 19 0 3 0 / 2.6
890392 1 9.5 1 1.5
870324 1 6.8 1 2.5
160411 1 2 2 0 / 6
080920 6 0 / 6 1 0
392330 2 0 / 6.5 1 3
760612 2 0 / 3 2 3 / 6.5
842720 4 0 / 6 2 0
761290 2 6.5 2 0 / 5.7
852990 41 0 34 0 / 5
200410 1 6 2 6.4 / 8
190410 7 4 / 6 1 1.1
Table 4: Washington State Exports to Canada - Top 25 6-digit HS Products:
           Non-Zero MFN Tariffs and Multiple 6-digit lines
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overall value of a shipment) to obtain 
a per-year cost of rules of origin for 
Alberta’s exports that were candidates 
for tariff streamlining. The transaction 
costs used in the Alberta study were 
obtained from other research for 
free trade areas such as the EFTA and 
ranged in value from 0.25 percent to 
2 percent per year. The benefit of tariff 
streamlining is that these costs can 
be eliminated. For Washington State 
exports to Canada, applying these 
two percentages as lower and upper 
bounds on transactions/compliance 
costs related to rules of origin yields 
annual savings in 2006 of between $6.1 
million and $48.8 million per year. 
With the 4 percent discount rate used 
by Ballantyne et al, this translates into 
a savings of between $153 million and 
$1.22 billion in present value terms. It 
is worth noting that these benefits are 
associated with the tariff streamlining 
that would be most easily implemented, 
because these are for cases of 6-digit HS 
codes where neither Canada nor the 
United States applies MFN duties. No 
tariff revenue would be lost from these 
changes to rules of origin.  
While these values for the benefits 
of tariff streamlining are significant 
even under the lowest percentage rate 
assumptions, it would be useful to 
refine the values in future work. One 
possible way to do this is to determine 
the restrictiveness of the rule of origin. 
The more complicated and constraining 
a rule of origin is, the more resources 
will be expended to meet the rule. 
Some evidence of this effect is provided 
in the average restrictiveness column 
of Figure 2. For each of the 1,464 HS6 
codes, we determined the value of the 
Estevadeordal (2000) rules-of-origin 
restrictiveness index. The values of this 
index range from 1 to 7, with higher 
values indicating a more restrictive rule. 
For example, a value of 6 indicates that 
a transformation between chapters of 
the HS code is needed while a value of 
4 means that a transformation between 
headings within a chapter is necessary 
to establish North American origin. 
Work by Kunimoto and Sawchuk 
(2005) has shown that the utilization of 
NAFTA preferences tends to decline as 
rules of origin become more restrictive. 
This suggests that removing the rules 
of origin for the most restrictive rules 
would increase use of NAFTA preferences 
and encourage intra-NAFTA trade.  
As shown in Figure 2, we find that 
restrictiveness levels are generally quite 
high for the items in the agricultural, 
energy, and commodity categories. For 
some agricultural categories such as live 
animals, the requirement of a chapter-
level change simply reflects the fact 
that these items can’t be “produced” 
from a mixture of originating and 
non-originating components. The 
restrictiveness level tends to be lower 
when manufactured goods are considered 
because of the greater ability to transform 
intermediate products or raw materials 
into a new manufactured item.
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One factor that could potentially 
reduce the benefits of tariff streamlining 
is the presence of a NAFTA “mini” 
customs union in computers and 
computer parts. This sectoral customs 
union is confined to Chapters 84 
and 85 of the tariff schedule and 
we would expect no benefits from 
tariff streamlining for HS codes that 
are already part of the mini-union. 
To investigate the effect of this for 
Washington State, we recalculate the 
benefits of tariff streamlining with 
Chapters 84 and 85 excluded from the 
trade figures. This adjustment for the 
effect of the mini-union lowers the 
annual benefits of tariff streamlining 
from a range of $6.1 - $48.8 million 
to $5.1 - $40.8 million. The reduction 
for Washington is less extreme than for 
other states such as California whose 
exports to Canada include a greater 
proportion of HS6 categories that are 
covered by the mini-union. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has identified several 
promising cases where simple changes 
to administrative rules would result in 
significant savings of transactions costs 
for the state of Washington.  Removal 
of rules of origin requirements for a 
number of products would also allow 
border personal to shift some of their 
time from rules of origin verification 
to a focus on interdicting undesirable 
5.4
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Figure 2: Average Restrictiveness of Rules of Origin by Sector
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goods or individuals seeking entry to 
the United States. This ability to shift 
resources from low-value revenue 
collection tasks to higher-value security 
activities is one of the benefits of the 
perimeter approach to border security. 
The benefits of tariff streamlining for 
Washington are significantly lower than 
those calculated by Ballantyne et al who 
found that just over CAN$ 25 billion in 
trade would be liberalized under their 
three criteria. The vast majority of this 
amount – CAN$ 23 billion – is from the 
Canada-U.S. zero MFN criterion also 
applied in this study for Washington 
State. Over half of the trade figure 
for Alberta (CAN$ 14.4 billion) was 
derived from Alberta’s exports of 
natural gas. Several factors account for 
our finding that the total amount of 
exports from Alberta that would benefit 
from proposed streamlining is greater 
than our corresponding amount for 
Washington:
- Ballantyne et al included a wider 
range of products with low tariffs.
- Alberta has a large proportion of its 
trade in a single commodity (natural 
gas) that meets the streamlining 
criteria.
- The volume of exports from Alberta 
to the United States is much larger 
than the volume of exports from 
Washington State to Canada. 
The results of our analysis for 
Washington are sufficiently promising 
to encourage further analysis of the 
potential U.S. benefits from tariff 
streamlining. It is worth noting that 
much of the benefit of tariff streamlining 
can be obtained by eliminating rules 
of origin for a few HS6 codes with 
large amounts of trade. In the case of 
Washington, the increase in benefits 
from examining the top 50 categories, 
versus just the top 25, was relatively 
modest: the range of estimated benefits 
extends from $3.76 million to $30.1 
million rather than from $3.2 million 
to $25.8 million.  On the other hand, 
perhaps the greatest benefits of NAFTA 
derive from the possibility of increased 
trade by smaller exporters dealing 
with less commonly traded goods. 
These exporters might not benefit if 
the elimination of rules of origin was 
limited to a few large categories. 
In future work, we will also examine 
a wider range of MFN categories, an 
approach that appears promising given 
our finding that tariff revenues are 
largely derived from a relatively small 
number of tariff categories. Finally, 
we will investigate the benefits for 
other U.S. states with eleventh export 
flows to Canada. As shown in Table 
5, Washington is ranked tenth among 
states in terms of exports to Canada 
(Washington is not one of the roughly 
38 states that have Canada as their top 
export market).  The results of this future 
analysis have the potential to point 
toward a fruitful new avenue for trade 
liberalization and enhanced prosperity 
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for the NAFTA countries. Security would 
also be enhanced as border agency 
resources can be switched from revenue 
collection and enforcement of rules of 
origin to security-related duties. 
Rank State Exports Rank State Exports
1 Michigan 23,794,064,614 28 Colorado 1,849,335,720
2 Unspecified 18,538,115,825 29 Arizona 1,841,227,759
3 Ohio 18,265,575,610 30 Louisiana 1,787,714,289
4 Texas 15,630,528,347 31 Oklahoma 1,716,650,338
5 California 14,194,028,221 32 Vermont 1,670,214,132
6 Illinois 12,332,757,035 33 Maryland 1,491,291,136
7 New York 12,225,961,099 34 Puerto Rico 1,387,530,482
8 Indiana 9,841,736,504 35 Arkansas 1,129,873,310
9 Pennsylvania 8,886,413,076 36 Mississippi 1,068,683,897
10 Tennessee 6,925,453,887 37 Nebraska 1,027,151,963
11 Washington 6,205,917,164 38 West Virginia 923,282,349
12 Kentucky 5,857,587,464 39 Maine 922,204,620
13 New Jersey 5,713,856,150 40 Utah 888,531,508
14 Wisconsin 5,446,924,974 41 North Dakota 726,737,792
15 North Carolina 5,379,008,696 42 Nevada 696,792,037
16 Missouri 4,818,171,600 43 Delaware 633,703,328
17 Georgia 4,706,549,260 44 NH 597,975,305
18 Minnesota 4,090,154,512 45 Idaho 561,323,984
19 Massachusetts 3,155,104,246 46 Rhode Island 548,178,866
20 South Carolina 3,151,955,223 47 Alaska 444,904,161
21 Iowa 3,065,278,684 48 South Dakota 438,180,037
22 Florida 2,992,233,765 49 Montana 433,532,268
23 Oregon 2,693,539,425 50 Wyoming 232,929,944
24 Virginia 2,635,557,781 51 New Mexico 194,284,677
25 Kansas 2,267,968,989 52 DC 25,861,148
26 Alabama 2,246,168,787 53 Hawaii 16,105,767
27 Connecticut 1,931,582,958 54 Virgin Islands 10,401,786
Table 5: Rank of States by Exports to Canada, 2006
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